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Is Trade Sexist? How “Pink” Tariff Policies’
Harmful Effects Can Be Curtailed Through
Litigation and Legislation
Miranda Hatch
Women in the United States face unconscious and conscious
sexism in many aspects of their lives. United States trade policy
exacerbates this issue by imposing gender-based tariff rates that
cause women to pay more for their apparel and footwear. This is
due to the United States placing different tariffs on different
products based on whether the product is meant for use by
“females” or “males.” While some tariffs favor men and some
favor women, the overall tariff burden still rests on women. The
goal of this Note is to discuss the likelihood of solving this problem
through litigation or legislation. This Note will first analyze and
review the two cases regarding this issue that have been heard at
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit level.
It will discuss why the tariffs are facially discriminatory, and why
they deserve to be treated with the intermediate scrutiny standard.
This Note will also show that with a changing culture and court
composition, courts may rule differently on this issue moving
forward. It will conclude by analyzing the possibility of these
gendered tariffs being abolished through legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
Clothing and footwear design is about so much more than just
aesthetics. Clothing manufacturers that import products must
constantly be thinking about the tariffs that are assigned to the
goods that they are importing and who the end users are. For
example, if you have ever purchased a female shirt from Columbia
Sportswear you may have noticed that many of their female blouses
and shirts have small pockets under the waist.1 This is because the
tariff is much lower when the pocket is present as it is no longer
classified as a female good.2 This is an interesting phenomenon
faced by many corporations country wide. However, this
phenomenon is hurting female consumers by making the goods
that they purchase more expensive due to the high tariff rates.

1. See Kai Ryssdal, Janet Nguyen, Bridget Bodnar & Maria Hollenhorst, There’s a
Reason Your Columbia Shirt Has a Tiny Pocket Near Your Waistline, MARKETPLACE (May 29,
2019), https://www.marketplace.org/2019/05/29/theres-a-reason-your-columbia-shirt-hasa-tiny-pocket-near-your-waistline.
2. See id. (explaining that the normal tariff on female blouses is reduced significantly
when the pocket below the waist is present because the blouse deviates from a more
typical design).
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When one thinks about the areas that still need improvement
before our country is completely gender equitable, the first thing
that one thinks of is likely not United States trade policy. However,
sexist trade practices have crept into our country’s policies,
therefore making things more expensive for women.3
The United States has used tariffs on goods to build revenue
since the start of our nation.4 While these tariffs started off as
simple, the United States now has a complicated tariff “schedule”
with different rates for many different types of goods.5 However,
these tariffs are not gender neutral.6 Many tariff rates differ based
on if the products are ultimately intended for “male” or “female”
users. For example, overalls for women have a 14% tariff but only
a 9% tariff for men.7 When it comes to swimsuits males face a higher
tariff burden at 28% with women at 12%.8 When this issue was first
discovered, researchers learned that because of the discriminatory
duties, U.S. importers had overpaid almost $1.3 billion dollars to
the U.S. government.9
While some of these tariffs do burden men more than women,
overall, it has been shown that these tariffs fall more on women.10
In 2015, the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs
compared male and female goods and found that women pay 8%
more for apparel than men.11 This wide gap in cost, when it comes
to apparel, can be traced back largely to the differential tariff rates.
3. See Artur Gailes, Tamara Gurevich, Serge Shikher & Marinos Tsigas, Gender and
Income Inequality in United States Tariff Burden (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n Econ. Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 2018–08–B, 2018), https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/
working_papers/ggst_-_gender_and_income_inequality_in_tariffs.pdf. See infra section
II.D.1 for further evidence of how gender-based tariffs disproportionately effect women.
4. See F.W. TAUSSIG, THE TARIFF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 16–19 (5th ed. 2010).
5. See Harmonized Tariff Schedule, 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (2021) [hereinafter HTSUS].
Although contained in statute, the HTSUS is maintained and published by the United States
Trade Commission, and updated edits can be found at https://hts.usitc.gov/.
6. See id.; Gailes et al., supra note 3, at 3.
7. Compare HTSUS, supra note 5, at heading 6103, with id. at heading 6104.
8. HTSUS, supra note 5, at heading 6112.
9. Matt Gersper & Tom Gould, Gender and Age Discrimination Cost U.S. Importers
Billions of Dollars, RETAIL INFO SYSTEMS (Oct. 23, 2007), https://risnews.com/gender-andage-discrimination-cost-us-importers-billions-dollars.
10. See infra section II.D.1 for further evidence of how gender-based tariffs
disproportionately effect women.
11. Anne-Marcelle Ngabirano, ‘Pink Tax’ Forces Women to Pay More Than Men, USA
TODAY (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business /2017/03/27/
pink-tax-forces-women-pay-more-than-men/99462846/.
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While many recognize that these tariffs are a problem, finding a
way to eradicate them is more complicated than it may seem.
Potential ways to eradicate the tariffs involve bringing successful
litigation to rule the tariffs unconstitutional or passing legislation
to change the tariff schedule. Both possibilities have failed to this
point. Regarding litigation, even though over 200 companies have
attempted to bring claims that these tariffs violate the Equal
Protection Clause, all the claims have been dismissed due to being
unsuccessful at the pleading stage.12 Two cases have been heard at
the Federal Circuit and have both been denied due to the court
ruling failure to state a claim.13 The court has not applied typical
gender discrimination analysis and has issued frustrating cases that
leave the issue unresolved. Regarding legislation, there has not yet
been a bill proposed to end gender-based tariffs specifically, and
bills presented to end gendered price discrimination have not
passed yet.14
This Note proceeds with three major parts. Part I examines the
current landscape of gender-based tariffs and how they came to be.
Part II discusses litigation that has been brought to United States
federal courts and how litigation may be the proper avenue to end
these tariffs. This Part summarizes the two cases (Totes-Isotoner and
Rack Room Shoes) regarding gender-based tariffs that have been
heard at the United States Trade Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Supreme Court has denied
granting certiorari in either of these cases.15 This Part concludes
with an analysis of the disparate impact and discriminatory intent
of the gender-based tariffs and analyzes if there is any avenue for
successful future litigation by considering court makeup, cultural
changes, and new evidence acquired since the original two cases
were brought. Part III examines current legislative proposals to end
gender-based tariffs and the likelihood of them being passed into
law. It also looks at other countries that have successfully ended

12. See infra Part II for a comprehensive list and further explanation of companies that
have brought cases regarding gender-based tariffs.
13. Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Rack Room
Shoes v. United States, 718 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
14. See infra section III.A for a further discussion on legislative proposals regarding
pink taxes and tariffs.
15. Rack Room Shoes v. United States, 572 U.S. 1114 (2014); Totes-Isotoner Corp. v.
United States, 562 U.S. 830 (2010).
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gender-based tariffs and how that model can be followed by the
United States. This Note concludes by showing how lowering
tariffs multilaterally on apparel and electing more women may also
aid in ending gender-based tariffs.
I. CURRENT PINK TARIFF LANDSCAPE
A. A Brief Overview of Apparel and Footwear Tariffs
Tariffs have been used by the United States since 1789 when the
Tariff Act was signed as an initial way to collect revenue.16 When
tariffs first began, only a few goods that were imported were
attached to tariff rates.17 However, what was once a simplistic tariff
schedule has developed over the past two hundred years into a
now hundred-plus page document known as the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS).18 This tariff schedule
contains extremely detailed descriptions of all of the tariffs that the
United States levies onto products entering the country.19 Congress
enacts the HTSUS, but the International Trade Commission
publishes and maintains the schedule and provides technical
information about its structure and modification.20 The President
can also unilaterally change tariff rates in retaliation for unfair
trading activities or for other statutory reasons such as a national
emergency or when U.S. security is at risk.21 Tariff rates also are
16. The
History
of
U.S.
Tariff
Policies,
U.S.
GLOB.
INVS.,
http://www.usfunds.com/tariff-timeline/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2021). The act was signed
because countries were not willing to enter into trade agreements with the United States
post-Revolutionary War. Id.
17. Id.
18. See HTSUS, supra note 5.
19. See id.
20. Tariff
Schedules,
OFFICE
OF
THE
U.S.
TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/issue-areas/industry-manufacturing/industrial-tariffs/tariff-schedules
(last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
21. CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11030, U.S. TARIFF POLICY:
OVERVIEW (2021). In general, Congress has the authority to create tariffs. However, various
policies allow for the President to unilaterally set tariff rates. Some of the notable powers
given to the President are:
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 empowers the President to adjust
tariffs on imports that threaten to impair U.S. national security. Section 5(b) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act and Section 203 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act empower the President in a time of war or emergency to
impose tariffs on all imports.
Id. at 2.
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usually lower for countries with which we have free trade
agreements.22 Tariff rates are usually changed and negotiated
during World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations.23
As the United States has entered the WTO and more and more
free trade agreements, tariff rates overall have gone down
dramatically.24 However, this large decrease in overall tariff rates
can actually be mostly attributed to low tariffs on goods such as
natural resources and farm products.25 While tariffs that do not
differentiate on the basis of gender have lowered over the years,
tariffs on apparel and footwear that do discriminate on the basis of
gender remain extremely high.26 It has been found that almost all
clothing and footwear is “dutiable” while other goods are not.27
Apparel tariff rates average around 11.6%; the only product groups
with higher tariff rates are tobacco, dairy products, and sugar.28 The
total average tariff rate among all goods is only 1.4%.29 Even though
clothing accounts for only 6% of all imports, it makes up almost half
of the United States’ tariff income.30 This commitment to keep
apparel and footwear tariffs high has been exemplified in the recent
trade war with China that has raised punitive tariffs on apparel to
extremely high levels.31

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Uros Andrejevic, Giuliana Campanelli Andreopoulos & Alexandros Panayides,
Tariffs in Apparel and Footwear: A Gender Approach, J. DIVERSITY MGMT., Third Quarter 2008, at
1, 1.
25. Id. at 1–2.
26. Id. at 2. The average tariff rate for apparel and footwear is 11.4% and generates
46.7% of total United States tariff revenue. Id.
27. Drew DeSilver, U.S. Tariffs Vary a Lot, but the Highest Duties Tend to Be on Imported
Clothing, PEW RSCH. CENTER (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2018/03/28/u-s-tariffs-vary-a-lot-but-the-highest-duties-tend-to-be-on-imported-clothing/.
28. Id.
29. Courtney Reagan, You’re Already Paying Tariffs on Clothing and Shoes, and Have Been
for Almost 90 Years, CNBC (Aug 9, 2018, 1:49 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/06/
americans-are-already-paying-tariffs-on-clothing-and-shoes.html.
30. Id.
31. Sheng Lu, US-China Tariff War, the Textile and Apparel Hit-List Updated, JUST STYLE
(Jan. 4, 2021), https://www.just-style.com/analysis/us-china-tariff-war-the-textile-andapparel-hit-list. In August of 2019, Trump raised the punitive tariffs on all apparel entering
the United States through China to 15% (on top of the tariff already in the HTSUS). Id.
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B. A Brief Overview of Gender-Based Tariffs
The HTSUS contains vast amounts of product descriptions for
apparel and footwear in order to ensure that different products can
be effectively categorized with the proper tariff rate.32 These
descriptions can become extremely specific, so instead of simply
saying “leather shoe” the HTSUS says “[f]ootwear with outer soles
of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of
leather.”33 Even though these descriptions are already extremely
specific, many goods are classified by gender as the last part of the
subheading.34 Therefore, everything is materially the same in the
goods aside from the gender of the ultimate user. Many tariffs on
U.S. goods are adopted from the International Harmonized System
of tariffs that has been negotiated during WTO negotiations;
however, the part of the U.S. tariff schedule that classifies based on
gender has not been adopted internationally.35
In 2014, it was found that “86% of US apparel imports and 79%
of US footwear imports were gender-classified by the United States
International Trade Commission (USITC).”36 There are currently
155 HTS categories of men-specific apparel and 160 categories of
women-specific apparel listed in HTSUS.37 For example, “‘suits,
ensembles, suit-type jackets, blazers, trousers, bib and brace
overalls, breeches and shorts (other than swimwear)’ are split into
two subheadings: HTS 6103 for ‘men’s or boys’’ and HTS 6104 for
‘women’s or girls’’”.38 Some of these gender differential tariffs are
set at the same rate, but many are very different for men and
women, with the majority hurting women. Right now, there are
currently 78 tariff provisions that have different rates attached to
them solely on the basis of gender.39

32. See generally HTSUS, supra note 5.
33. Jason Lewis, Gender-Classified Imports: Equal Protection Violations in the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 171, 175 (2011).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 176–77.
36. Lori L. Taylor & Jawad Dar, Fairer Trade: Removing Gender Bias in US Import Taxes,
6 MOSBACHER INST. POLICY BRIEFS 1, 3 (2015).
37. Gailes et al., supra note 3, at 11.
38. Id.
39. See HTSUS, supra note 5. See infra section II.D.1 for a further explanation of the
difference between the tariff rates and how they negatively impact women.
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The history of these gender-based tariffs is difficult to parse out
due to limited public information regarding trade negotiations.
However, each different tariff provision has a different history
attached to it. Almost all tariffs started out as gender-neutral and
have had gendered provisions added to them over time.40 Footwear
tariffs exemplify this well. The initial tariffs on footwear were
established in 1789 by the Tariff Act and were not differentiated by
gender at all. However, in 1951 President Truman signed the
Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which amended the Tariff Act and created different tariff rates for
men and women’s footwear.41
The federal government is the only entity that has been
applying gender-differentiated tariffs.42 States themselves have
control of their own state tax codes, and although some female
goods are unfairly taxed or set at higher price points by sellers,
there is no evidence of differential tax rates for goods that are the
same for men and women besides their gender.43 It is important to
note that there is no federal law that prohibits gendered price
discrimination.44 This means that it is fine for the companies that
are getting charged these discriminatory tariffs to then in turn
transfer the burden of these tariffs onto the consumer through
higher costs on goods.
To understand the existence of these tariffs, it is also important
to consider who may benefit from their imposition. The clear
winners of these tariffs are the United States government who get
to collect the tariffs, American producers of apparel who face less
competition from overseas, and men who pay less for goods
compared to women. However, it will be shown throughout this

40. Complaint at 4, Blue Star Imps. LP v. United States, No. 13-00180 (Ct. Int’l Trade
filed May 5, 2013).
41. A. Zerkowitz & Co. v. United States, 54 Cust. Ct. 151, 153 (Cust. Ct. 1965).
42. Natasha Bach, 35 States in the U.S. Still Charge Women a Tampon Tax, FORTUNE (June
11, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/06/11/tampon-tax-us-states/. Even though
there are not differential rates for the same products, there are high taxes on tampons that
are considered discriminatory. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bourree Lam, Battle of the Prices: Is It Ever Fair to Charge One Sex More?, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 18, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/battle-of-theprices-is-it-ever-fair-to-charge-one-sex-more/381546/. There are, however, various state
laws that make gendered price discrimination illegal such as the Unruh Act in California. Id.
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Note that these potential benefits do not outweigh the harm that
the tariffs impose upon women.
II. ENDING PINK TARIFFS THROUGH LITIGATION
Before 2007, the issue of gender-based tariffs was largely
unknown. However, this issue was likely discovered by a trade
attorney who spent years exploring the issue.45 It was then covered
by the New York Times, which caused the issue to gain more
traction in the legal field.46 In the years between 2007 and 2011,
hundreds of companies filed complaints in the U.S. Court of
International Trade (CIT) alleging that tariffs were discriminating
on the basis of sex and had caused the companies to incur monetary
damages in overpaying for goods.47 Notable companies to file
claims include Steve Madden,48 Pacific Sunwear of California,49
Ann Taylor,50 L.C. Footwear,51 Blue Star Imports,52 Century 21,53

45. Michael Barbaro, In Apparel, All Tariffs Aren’t Created Equal, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/28/business/28gender.html; Michael Barbaro,
Clothing Makers Allege Sex Discrimination in U.S. Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-tariffs.4.5494193.html.
It is again interesting to highlight the fact that gender-based tariffs were not commonly
discussed or written about before this article. Id.
46. Id.
47. Complaint, Steve Madden Ltd. v. United States, No. 1:07-cv-00136 (Ct. Int’l Trade
Apr. 5, 2007).
48. Id.
49. Complaint, Pac. Sunwear of Cal., Inc. v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-00300 (Ct. Int’l
Trade Aug. 16, 2011).
50. Complaint, Ann Taylor Inc. v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00187 (Ct. Int’l Trade
May 9, 2013).
51. Complaint, L.C. Footwear LLC v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00189 (Ct. Int’l Trade
May 10, 2013).
52. Complaint, Blue Star Imports LP v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00180 (Ct. Int’l Trade
May 7, 2013).
53. Complaint, Century 21 v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00188 (Ct. Int’l Trade May 9,
2013).
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Columbia Sportwear,54 Asics,55 Payless,56 Target,57 Tommy
Hilfiger,58 Marshalls,59 TJ Maxx,60 Prada,61 Ecco,62 and Quicksilver.63
The vast majority of cases never got their day in court because
they were put on the backburner while the two cases that did reach
the CIT were litigated as they were all challenging the same
substantial issue.64 The court did, however, give these companies
permission to file amicus curiae briefs regarding the cases that
would end up being litigated.65
A. Equal Protection as Applied to Gender Discrimination
Understanding the Equal Protection clause in the context of
gender discrimination is critical in navigating the legal issues
surrounding gender-based tariffs. The Fourteenth Amendment of
the Constitution states that “nor shall any State . . . deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”66
This means that individuals in similar situations must be treated
equally by the law. All equal protection claims are evaluated
against three different levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis.67 A stricter level of
scrutiny corresponds with less deference given to the Government

54. Barbaro, supra note 45.
55. Id.
56. Gersper & Gould, supra note 9.
57. Id.
58. Mike Cherney, Hilfiger, Others Sue US Over Gender-Based Duties, LAW 360 (Aug. 20,
2009, 3:20 PM), https://www-law360-com/articles/117517/hilfiger-others-sue-us-overgender-based-duties.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Ryan Davis, Prada, Ecco Latest to Challenge Gender-Based Duties, LAW 360 (Aug. 17,
2011, 2:01 PM), https://www-law360-com/articles/265498/prada-ecco-latest-to-challengegender-based-duties.
62. Id.
63. Kaitlin Ugolik, Quicksilver, DC Shoes Sue US Over Gender-Biased Tariffs, LAW 360
(Oct. 16, 2013, 8:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/480905/quicksilver-dc-shoessue-us-over-gender-biased-tariffs.
64. Docket, Steve Madden Ltd. v. United States, No. 1:07-cv-00136 (Ct. Int’l Trade filed
Apr. 5, 2007).
65. Id.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
67. Russell M. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
121, 122 (1989).
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regarding its explanation for the discrimination.68 In cases alleging
gender discrimination, the Supreme Court has applied the
standard of intermediate scrutiny.69
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that when the
language of a statute or provision of law is facially discriminatory
on the basis of sex, that it will apply the intermediate scrutiny
standard. This means that when the law is shown to be facially
discriminatory, the Government must show that it serves an
important government interest and that the regulation is
substantially related to the goal the distinctions are trying to
achieve in order for the facial discrimination to be upheld.70
The other way to show discrimination on the basis of gender is
through a disparate impact analysis.71 This analysis comes into play
when the language of the law or provision is gender neutral, but
one gender is more negatively affected by this rule than another. In
this case, it must be shown that the government specifically
intended to disproportionately affect one gender over the other.72
Both a facial discrimination philosophy and a disparate impact
philosophy have been used to bring forward cases regarding
gender-based tariffs. The sections below will analyze the two cases
that have been decided by the Federal Circuit, the actual impact of
these tariffs, and the likelihood of future litigation succeeding to
abolish the gender-based tariffs.
B. Facial Discrimination and Totes-Isotoner
The first case alleging gender discrimination in tariffs was
brought by Totes-Isotoner, a company that sells gloves, raincoats,
and other products for bad weather.73 The United States places a
14% tariff on men’s seamed leather gloves and a 12.6% tariff on
seamed gloves for “other persons” (which can be assumed to
68. Id.
69. See id. at 124.
70. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). The case goes on to clarify that
“[t]he justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to
litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents,
capacities, or preferences of males and females.” Id.
71. To clarify, disparate impact analysis is only done when something is not
discriminatory on its face. It is completely separate from the tiers of scrutiny analysis. See
Galloway, supra note 67, at 124–25.
72. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
73. See generally TOTES-ISOTONER, https://www.totes.com/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2021).
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include gloves for women and children).74 Totes-Isotoner argued
that these gloves were exactly the same besides the gender
classification and that there was no explanation for the different
tariff rates beyond gender, which in turn was a constitutional
violation.75 Totes-Isotoner asserted that the gender-based tariffs
violated the Equal Protection guarantees that were incorporated
through the Due Process Clause.76 Totes-Isotoner used the
philosophy that the tariffs were facially discriminatory and sought
damages based on the extra money that they have had to pay for
their imports based on the discriminatory tariffs.77 They alleged
that because they import gloves for men at the higher tariff rate that
they have lost profits over time.78
This case was first brought to the Court of International Trade
in July of 2008. The government wanted the case immediately
dismissed due to it being a political question and their assertion
that Totes-Isotoner did not have standing to bring the claim.79 They
also claimed that Totes-Isotoner had not met their burden in
pleading.80 The CIT rejected the political question argument due to
the fact that courts commonly are the ones that review Equal
Protection claims, and even though tariff agreements may be made
internationally, they are enacted into United States law by
Congress, therefore making them justiciable laws.81 They rejected
the standing argument because Totes-Isotoner fulfills the standing
requirements set previously by the courts: they have suffered an
injury through loss of profit, this injury was caused by the
defendant’s conduct as the government set the allegedly
discriminatory tariffs, and the injury is redressable in court because
grant of redress can be given.82
74. See Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade 739, 741 (2008). The
tariff schedule actually refers to the classification as “other persons[,]” but since there is a
male classification, the suspect classification can be assumed to be for women. Id.; see HTSUS,
supra note 5 for actual language employed by the tariff schedule.
75. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 9–10, Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 32
Ct. Int’l Trade 739 (2008) (No. 2009-113).
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Id.
79. See Totes-Isotoner, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade at 740.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 741.
82. Id. at 745.
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However, the CIT ruled that Totes-Isotoner did not plead
sufficient facts to state a valid claim.83 The CIT followed the
pleading standard described in Twombly that requires plaintiffs to
provide factual allegations that are “enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the
allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).”84
The CIT seemed to be applying an intermediate scrutiny analysis
by ruling that Totes-Isotoner must allege that “the government has
engaged in gender-based discrimination without an exceedingly
persuasive justification, or in other words, that the government has
used discriminatory means that are not substantially related to
important governmental objectives.”85 It then cited to United States
v. Virginia, a preeminent case on intermediate scrutiny.86 However,
it then ruled that Totes-Isotoner must plead facts that show that
there was a governmental purpose in discrimination.87 It does make
a slight nod to facial discrimination by acknowledging that this can
prove discriminatory purpose, but the court ruled that this is not a
valid argument because the complaint did not say that the
Government was discriminating “based on” the gender of the
alleged user of the product.88 It validated this by saying that the
goods are not necessarily sold to someone of the gender they were
designated for. The court said that “[discriminating] ‘[o]n the basis
of’ indicates foundation or fundamental element rather than
objective.”89 The CIT ruled that:
Nonetheless, because the challenged tariff classifications
are, at worst, “in between” classifications that impose a
facially discriminatory tax and classifications that are not
facially discriminatory, Plaintiff must at least include an
allegation that the challenged tariff classifications distribute
the burdens of the tax rate imposed in a way that

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 747.
Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 747.
Id. at 749.
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disadvantages one sex as a whole, or has a disproportionate
impact based on sex.90
After dismissing the case for failure to state a claim, the CIT
heard the case again on appeal in November of 2008. Totes-Isotoner
wanted again to argue that the tariffs were facially discriminatory,
and therefore malicious government intent should be inferred
rather than proven through pleadings. The CIT ruled that in order
for that inference to be made, it must first be sufficiently shown that
the tariffs were facially discriminatory, a burden which they did not
believe Totes-Isotoner met.91 The court does not go into detail about
why that burden was not met, but rather just suffices with the
conclusion that it was not by saying “[a] product’s mere
classification based on the anticipated principal use of the good
does not inherently mandate that the articles actually be so used,
making the classification’s effect on purchasers of different genders
questionable at best.”92 However, this reasoning seems faulty when
you change the scenario to race instead of gender. For example, if
products clearly marketed to Black hair had much higher tariffs
than hair products clearly marketed to White hair, there would
likely be less acceptance of the differential tariffs. This example
highlights the logical fallacies in the court’s quick rejection of the
facial discrimination standard.
Probably due to these frustrations, the case was appealed and
heard by the Federal Circuit.93 The court spent most of its analysis
discussing whether Totes-Isotoner provided enough facts to
properly state a claim, rather than focusing on the actual claim
itself. It also upheld the lower court’s decision that Totes-Isotoner
did not properly state a claim, although on different grounds than
the CIT.94 When the court decided the issue, it did not use the
intermediate scrutiny test like the CIT did before them, but rather
applied the rational basis test.95 The circuit court used precedent of
a tax law case that distinguished items of property of the same class

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

664

Id. at 750.
See Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 32 Ct. Int’l Trade 1172, 1178 (2008).
Id. at 1180.
See generally Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1353–54.
Id. at 1354.
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and applied different tax rates to the different property.96 The
court ruled that tariffs fit more into this analysis rather than a
gender discrimination analysis because the rates were actually
differentiating on the basis of products rather than differentiating
on the basis of gender.97 Due to the ease of passing a rational
basis standard, the court ruled that not enough facts had
been presented.98
When considering sex discrimination, the Federal Circuit only
discussed the facial discrimination analysis in a brief footnote and
spent the body of the case doing a disparate impact analysis.99 The
Federal Circuit made a rare distinction and said that tariff
discrimination must show more than disparate impact.100 It gave
two reasons for this. First, when Congress makes tariffs, it is not
concerned with the characteristics of the end user of the good, and
tariff rates are based on multilateral negotiations and many
different factors.101 It ruled that the gendered rates likely show that
the products are actually completely different and go through
different channels of trade.102 The second reason is that Congress
has broad deference in setting taxes so it cannot be assumed that
this differentiation is “invidious.”103 It quoted the Supreme Court
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: “No scheme
of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or
purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free
of all discriminatory impact.”104
There is a concurrence in the case that does touch on facial
discrimination. Judge Prost determined that the tariff rates were
not facially discriminatory reasoning that “[i]t imposes a burden on
importers, not gender- or age-based classes of people.”105 However,
Judge Prost failed to consider that costs get passed down from

96. Id.; see generally Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster
County, 488 U.S. 336 (1989)
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1358.
99. Id. at 1355.
100. Id. at 1356.
101. Id. at 1356–57.
102. Id. at 1357.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1358.
105. Id. at 1359.
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importers to end users. Totes-Isotoner appealed for certiorari by the
Supreme Court, but the appeal was denied.106
C. Rack Room Shoes and Disparate Impact
Only a few years after the Totes-Isotoner decision, a new round
of lawsuits began. Rack Room, Forever 21, and Skiz Imports came
together as joint plaintiffs to have their case heard yet again at the
Court of International Trade regarding the gender-based tariffs.107
Each of these three companies alleged sex-discrimination regarding
the gender-based tariffs.108
The first time the CIT heard the case in February 2012 it again
dismissed for failure to state a claim.109 Because the court in TotesIsotoner had ruled that the tariffs were not facially discriminatory,
and that more than disparate impact was needed, the court held
that an inference of invidious discrimination needed to be pled in
the facts.110 The CIT held the plaintiffs to the high standard of
showing that “[r]ather, discriminatory purpose in this particular
context arises only when Congress selects or reaffirms a particular
course of action ‘because of’ and not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.”111 The plaintiffs argued that
because Congress could have used many other distinguishing
factors besides gender, that it was discriminatory in choosing to use
gender above all else.112 The CIT rejected this argument by saying
that the plaintiffs were simply restating that the claims were facially
discriminatory.113 The plaintiffs also presented a 1960 Tariff
Classification Study which stated that certain age and gender
distinctions within the HTSUS were of “questionable” economic
justification.114 The CIT also rejected this argument by saying that it
does not show any congressional intent or that the tariffs were

106. Ryan Davis, High Court Won’t Weigh In on Gender-Based Duties, LAW 360 (Oct. 5,
2010), https://www.law360.com/articles/198955/high-court-won-t-weigh-in-on-genderbased-duties.
107. Rack Room Shoes v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2012).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1343.
110. Id. at 1346.
111. Id. (citing Pers. Admin’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1347.
114. Id.
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discriminatory, but it did not explain this more than simply
rejecting it.115
In June of 2012, the CIT heard an appeal from Rack Room. The
plaintiffs wanted the court again to look at facial discrimination,
but the court simply dismissed this idea by citing a line from TotesIsotoner that says, “Inherent in the power to tax is the power to
discriminate in taxation.”116 The CIT also ruled rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions
of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”117 They ruled that
according to the Twombly pleading standard, sufficient facts still
must be shown.118
One year later, in June of 2013, the case was heard by the
Federal Appeals Circuit.119 The Federal Circuit separated out the
claims brought by each plaintiff. Rack Room, mainly an importer of
footwear, argued that the tariffs on footwear unconstitutionally
discriminated on the basis of sex. Their main argument was that
“Congress intended to discriminate by directing and implementing
classifications based on gender when it could have used other nongender factors to distinguish or to separate merchandise for duty
assessment purposes.”120 Forever 21, an apparel company,
challenged dozens of discriminatory provisions on different goods
that they import. They relied on the same arguments as Rack
Room.121 Skiz is different in the sense that they were incorporated
solely for the purpose of bringing the lawsuit.122 Skiz imports goods
that have differential tariffs but does not sell any of them.123 Skiz
relied on the same arguments as Rack Room and Forever 21.124
The court ruled on whether a sufficient claim had been plead. It
did not analyze whether the tariffs were facially discriminatory, but
rather assumed that they were facially neutral due to the logic in
Totes-Isotoner that the differing rates actually just differentiated
115. Id. at 1347–48.
116. Memorandum and Order at 4, Rack Room Shoes v. United States, 821 F. Supp. 2d
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2012) (No. 07-00404).
117. Id. at 5.
118. Id. at 6.
119. Rack Room Shoes v. United States, 718 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
120. Id. at 1373 (citing Rack Room Shoes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 1346).
121. Id. at 1374.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See id.
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between products rather than between genders.125 Due to this, it
ruled that the plaintiffs must show discriminatory intent and
impact.126 The court rejected Rack Room’s argument about
Congress not using reasonable alternatives to classify goods by
saying, “[p]ermitting an inference of discriminatory intent merely
on the basis of the government’s decision to forgo an alternative
that does not mention age or gender would eviscerate the
requirement that claimants must plead intent to state an equal
protection claim.”127 Forever 21’s claims were also dismissed for
failure to state a claim, using the logic that the evidence that they
brought (the 1960 tariff study) was not specifically about the tariffs
at issue in their case.128 Rack Room and Forever 21 petitioned for
this issue to be heard by the United States Supreme Court.
However, this petition was denied.129
D. The Actual Disparate Impact of Pink Tariffs
The question remains: Is there any way for gender-based tariffs
to be ruled unconstitutional through litigation? It seems strange
knowing that over 200 companies have brought cases about the
unconstitutionality of these tariffs, yet none of them have made it
past the pleading stage allowing evidence to be uncovered. At this
point surpassing the large pleading burden does appear to be a
difficult task. It seems that the Federal Circuit ignored previous
precedent and did not apply constitutional standards in ways that
they typically are applied. The lack of examination of facial
discrimination in almost all of the cases seems to be an oversight,
so one must now ask what needs to change for it to be considered.
It is also noteworthy that neither decision has ever been cited in
other appellate court decisions.130
If the case is brought again, those bringing it can again argue
facial discrimination or they can choose to argue disparate impact,
but without significant changes in jurisprudence it is unlikely that
125. Id. at 1376.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1377.
128. Id. at 1378.
129. Zachary Zagger, High Court Denies Retailers’ Bid To Nix Gender-Based Tariff, LAW
360 (May 19, 2014, 1:53 PM), https://www-law360-com/articles/539073/high-court-deniesretailers-bid-to-nix-gender-based-tariff.
130. This information was found using Westlaw citing references resources.
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either will succeed. The easiest way for future litigation to end these
tariffs is through showing that they are in fact facially
discriminatory and for this argument to be analyzed by the court at
long last. If this can be done, then disparate impact does not need
to be proven. The Supreme Court has said that “a law or policy is
discriminatory on its face if it expressly classifies persons on the
basis of race or gender.”131 Courts have also held that the starting
point for determining facial discrimination is looking at the text of
the statute.132 This seems to apply to the gender-based tariffs as they
do explicitly apply different rates to different genders. One of the
arguments made by the court was the tariffs were about different
products in different markets, but because there are so many vast
characterizations regarding material, quality, and function before
gender, it seems unlikely that the products are that vastly different
besides gender. This is because everything else is already
accounted for such as material used, form of the item, purpose of
the item, and sometimes even the weight of the item. Because all
these things are accounted for it is likely that the end product is
vastly similar. The race example presented earlier is also helpful to
realize that discriminating on the basis of the end intended user
should very clearly be facially discriminatory.
It is important to note when applying current Supreme Court
decisions that if a law, tax, or statute discriminates on its face, actual
discriminatory impacts do not need to be shown.133 However, the
decisions in Totes-Isotoner seem to disregard this ruling. In fact, in
the Totes-Isotoner concurrence that was cited later in Rack Room,
Judge Prost said that the tariffs were not facially discriminatory
because they “[impose] a burden on importers, not gender- or agebased classes of people.”134 While this seems like an illogical
standard as it is not technically required in facial discrimination
analysis, the following section will show how these tariffs do in fact
place a burden on gender classes, and that burden is on women.

131.
132.
(1993).
133.
134.

Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1084 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533–34
See Berkley, 287 F.3d at 1084.
Totes-Isotoner Corp. v. United States, 594 F.3d 1346, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).

669

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:2 (2022)

1. Gender-based tariffs’ impact on women
My own research and others’ have shown that gender-based
tariffs do impact female consumers more than men. Even though
there are certain gender-based tariffs that do charge more for male
rather than female goods, the gender-based tariffs overall affect
women more.
Previous empirical studies are limited on the matter of how
tariffs affect men and women differently. However, in 2018 the
International Trade Commission released a report that stated that
the tariff burden is heavier on women.135 Still, they found that
“while the average applied U.S. tariff on men’s apparel is about
12%, the average applied U.S. tariff on women’s apparel is about
15%.”136 The researchers found that “the tariff burden for U.S.
households on women’s apparel was $2.77 billion more than on
men’s clothing. This gender gap [grew] about 11% in real terms
between 2006 and 2016.”137 Overall, they found that the tariff
burden on apparel is twice as large for women as it is for men.138 In
order to calculate this differential, they not only looked at the tariff
rate on paper, but also at consumption habits and how often new
products are purchased.139 Even though they looked at spending,
they concluded that “the growth of the gender gap in tariff burden
is mainly due to the faster growth of the average applied tariff rate
on women’s apparel.”140
Because research is sparse on the absolute tariff burden due to
purely the gender-based tariffs, I used data from the United States
International Trade Commission Dataweb to calculate the genderbased tariffs that have been collected for the last five years.141 I first
found the seventy-eight provisions in the HTSUS that were exactly
the same, except for the intended gender of the user of the goods.
These provisions contained different tariffs for the female and male
goods. Using the Dataweb’s data request portal, I requested the
dutiable value of the goods based on the individual tariff codes. I
135. Gailes et al., supra note 3, at 3. Note that this is still a working paper that does not
purport to show the views of the Commission as a whole.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 20.
141. See generally USTIC DATAWEB, https://dataweb.usitc.gov/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2021).
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used the years 2015–2019 to calculate this (excluding 2020 for likely
trade discrepancies due to the COVID-19 pandemic). After
identifying the dutiable value, I applied the tariff rate found in the
HTSUS to calculate the tariff that would have been paid. This
information may not be the complete picture as I did not include
tariff discounts made through Free Trade Agreements that the
United States has agreed upon, as these specific tariff rates are very
difficult to obtain. Below is the table showing the different tariff
rates paid for female and male goods, clearly showing that more
tariffs are paid on female goods. This, along with the higher
averaged tariff rate for women, shows a clear disparate impact on
women. Especially because researchers have shown that in many
cases, the burden of tariffs can impact the consumer more than the
corporation selling the goods.142

Total Tariffs
Collected

Tariffs Assigned
to Goods Intended
for Male Use

Tariffs Assigned
to Goods Intended
for Female Use

Difference

$4,242,230,280

$4,922,454,931

$680,224,651143

Neither Totes-Isotoner nor Rack Room claimed in their pleadings
that one gender is more impacted by the tariff rates than others.
Instead, they focused on the pure fact that there are differentials in
the rates.144 Adding this newly found information from the 2018
study and the data shown from the ITC Dataweb may provide
strong evidence that women in fact are more impacted, which may
persuade the court of facial discrimination.
However, the court in Rack Room ruled that something more
than disparate impact is required, and it is difficult to know what
that exactly means. One can hope that if the court was presented
142. Taylor & Dar, supra note 36, at 2.
143. Another vital analysis would be to apply male tariff rates to the female goods to
determine if women face the higher tariff burden because they purchase more. This will be
further analyzed in later iterations of this paper, that focus more completely on the idea that
it may depend on the individual consumer and whether or not the tariff rates burden them.
Even if this proves to be true, it is still worrisome that the Government is determining tariffs
on the basis of sex. There is also significant evidence that goes against this initial finding, so
further research will need to be done.
144. See supra sections II.B–C for clarifying discussion of the claims brought in the
Totes-Isotoner and Rack Room litigation.
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with this evidence, it would at least consider the tariff burden faced
by women and how it exacerbates inequality.
2. Government discriminatory intent
If in future litigation the court asks for government
discriminatory intent to be shown in the pleadings, it may also be
difficult to prove. Once disparate impact is shown, it is also
necessary to show that those making the tariffs had some form of
discriminatory intent while creating the tariff schedule. This point
is harder to find because there has been no case that has reached
the point of requiring discovery on the side of the government.
There is almost no evidence that the government created these
differential tariffs for any valid governmental reason; however,
there is also not strong evidence against it due to the almost
secretive nature of tariff negotiations and lack of public information
regarding the behind-door deal making.
The main argument for discriminatory intent is that by
choosing to include the different classifications on the basis of
gender, the discriminatory intent is evident on its face. Goods are
classified in extremely numerous ways in the tariff schedule before
gender is even applied. Type of material, quality of the
workmanship, and many other considerations are included in the
schedule before the gendered distinctions.145
However, there is also some other valuable information
available that may prove discriminatory intent. Some scholars have
the theory that the differing tariffs can actually be attributed to
powerful lobbying in Washington.146 They believe that the
companies producing apparel want to limit competition and that
Washington is okay with this trade-off because it means that they
will in turn receive more revenue.147 In contrast, many have
reported that it is hard to find any valid fiscal explanation for why
these tariffs exist.148 Also, the 1960 study was done on tariff
145. See generally HTSUS, supra note 5.
146. Andrejevic et al., supra note 24, at 3.
147. See id.
148. Timm Betz, David Fortunato & Diana Z. O’Brien, Women’s Descriptive
Representation and Gendered Import Tax Discrimination, 115 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 307, 309 (2020).
“Finally, although changes to the tariff schedule can have meaningful revenue consequences
for governments there is no obvious fiscal justification for imposing gendered tariff rates of
the kind displayed above.” Id.
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classifications and found that the classifications regarding gender
were “often difficult if not impossible to make and their economic
justification is questionable.”149 The study continued to say that,
“[W]e feel that the [Tariff] Commission is acting wisely in its
proposal to eliminate differentiation by gender, and we would not
recommend continuing that differentiation, and that is the reason
why we have established the single rate for [specific goods] in our
proposal.”150 Further evidence in the lack of purpose for these
tariffs is that they have not always been present. In fact, when the
United States’ first tariff schedule was released, there were
absolutely no distinctions by gender.151
One thing that is known is that gendered tariffs have been
negotiated at previous trade rounds. For example, “[f]ollowing the
negotiations of the Uruguay round, the United States rate for men’s
leather gloves increased while the rate for women’s leather gloves
decreased.”152 This shows that government officials are aware of
these trade differentials, and that they are apparent in trade
negotiations meaning that there is in fact useful information that
could be uncovered if discovery were ever ordered.
The government’s main arguments against any sort of
discriminatory intent are that the negotiations that go into making
the HTSUS are highly technical, that the HTSUS does not
discriminate against people, but it just treats products differently,
and that commercial considerations go into why tariffs are set.153
Jason Lewis introduced and debunked all of these arguments in his
note on gender-classified tariffs.154
Regarding the first issue of the fact that multilateral
negotiations take place in highly technical landscapes, he responds
that even though the base tariff rates are set at these technical
multilateral trade rounds, it is the United States who has added

149. Complaint at 6, Pac. Sunwear of Cal., Inc. v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-00300 (Ct.
Int’l Trade Aug. 16, 2011) (quoting Tariff Classification Study, Schedule 7, U.S. Tariff
Commission (1960)).
150. Complaint at 6, Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc. v. United States (Ct. Int’l Trade Aug.
14, 2013) (quoting Tariff Classification Study, Schedule 7, U.S. Tariff Commission (1960)).
151. Complaint at 3, L.C. Footwear LLC v. United States, No. 1:13-cv-00189 (Ct. Int’l
Trade May 10, 2013).
152. Lewis, supra note 33, at 177.
153. Id. at 190.
154. Id. at 190–95.
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gender classifications after the trade talks.155 Even if these
negotiations were made in a technical matter, it is still vital that they
comply with United States law and not be discriminatory.156 The
second argument made by the United States government that the
discrimination is against products and not people also relies on
faulty logic. The major issue here is that neither of the government’s
briefs (for Totes-Isotoner or Rack Room) show that the male and
female goods are in fact substantially different in any way.157 The
government also fails to show that the tax is not something
exclusively based on gender.158 The third argument presented is
that commercial considerations drive the difference in tariff rates.159
It seems hard to imagine a commercial consideration that would
pass a rational basis test. Lewis argues that the commercial reasons
for tariffs are to raise revenue and protect certain industries.160
Surely for these considerations to be valid, the difference in tariff
rates between genders would have to be much larger than they are.
Right now, the tariff differences are large enough to cost more for
women than men but small enough not to adequately protect the
domestic female apparel industry.
E. The Future of Pink Tariff Litigation
The case in Rack Room was brought in 2014. Since then, there
have been large movements to end gender discrimination. The
#metoo movement in 2017 brought discussions about women’s
rights and sexual assault to the forefront of public discussion
and debate.161 In 2016, Hilary Clinton became the first woman to
receive a presidential nomination from a major political party. In
2018, more women than ever were elected to Congress. In 2021,

155. Id. at 191.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 194.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 196.
160. See id.
161. #MeToo: A Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Feb 4, 2021, 1:52 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html.
Although the #metoo movement officially started in 2017, there have been events continually
occurring that have been connected and attributed to the movement as found in this timeline.
Id.
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Kamala Harris was elected as the first woman Vice President.162
Katherine Tai has just been nominated as the U.S. Trade
Representative, only the third woman to ever hold this position.163
I pose that the outcome of future pink tariff cases might come out
differently with the strong evidence of disparate impact and an
ever-changing cultural landscape.
1. United States trade court composition
The issue of pink tariff litigation is unique in that it cannot just
be brought up for appeal in another circuit with the hope of a circuit
split. This is because the U.S. Trade Court has exclusive jurisdiction
over all the issues that arise out of customs and international trade
laws, and all of their cases are appealed to the same circuit court.164
However, different judges on the CIT may come to a completely
different outcome. There are currently seven active judges on the
Court of International Trade. Of those judges, three were appointed
by Barack Obama, three were appointed by Donald Trump, and the
Chief Justice was appointed by President Barack Obama.165 Two of
the eight justices are female. All seven justices (besides the Chief
Justice) have begun their judgeships since the Totes-Isotoner and
Rack Room decisions.166 Due to the completely new makeup of the
court, and the greater presence of females and appointees by
Democratic Presidents, it may also be likely for a different decision
to come out of the court.

162. Women’s
History
Milestones:
A
Timeline,
HISTORY.COM,
https://www.history.com/topics/womens-history/womens-history-us-timeline
(last
updated July 21, 2021).
163. Timm Betz, David Fortunato & Diana Z. O’Brien, The Pink Tax That’s Costing
Women Billions of Dollars a Year—and What We Can Do About It, MS. MAGAZINE (Dec. 23, 2020),
https://msmagazine.com/2020/12/23/holiday-christmas-gifts-shopping-pink-tax-costingwomen-billions-dollars/.
164. About the Court, U.S. CT. OF INT’L TRADE, https://www.cit.uscourts.gov/aboutcourt (last visited Oct. 5, 2021). “The court has a residual grant of exclusive jurisdictional
authority to decide any civil action against the United States, its officers, or its agencies
arising out of any law pertaining to international trade.” Id.
165. U.S.
Court
of
International
Trade:
Judges,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-court-international-trade-judges (last visited
Sept. 15, 2021).
166. Id.
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2. New evidence of government recognition of the issue
One of the biggest issues when bringing pink tariff cases has
been the inability to show governmental recognition of the issue, or
any evidence that the tariffs were applied in or created with
discriminatory intent. However, in 2016, a report prepared by the
Democratic party staff of the U.S. Congress Joint Economic
Committee (JEC) identified the higher tariff rates placed on
women’s goods as the first possible explanation for the pink tax.167
This report focused on the price differentials that men and women
pay for different goods. The report found that across numerous
industry categories that women simply pay more for their goods
than men for no apparent reason. They acknowledged that “the
higher costs of importing may be passed on to consumers and
contribute to the markup on some goods targeted to women.”168
This simple acknowledgement of the issue may be further evidence
that can be presented to the court for lack of rationale for these
tariffs. Another piece of evidence is the working paper released by
the U.S. International Trade Commission discussed earlier.169 This
paper, although it does have the warning associated that it does not
say that the Commission agrees with all of the views proposed, is
still momentous as it very directly condemns gendered tariffs and
connects their usage to price discrimination.170
Although troubling legal precedent imposes a high hurdle for
future cases, a new court makeup, alongside a shifting culture, and
new evidence may lead to a different decision.
III. ENDING PINK TARIFFS THROUGH LEGISLATION
Even with the positive cultural changes, relying on the
unpredictable court system can seem futile since cases have been
continuously dismissed when claims do not reach the necessary
level of pleading. The court has heightened the standard of
litigation to somewhere seemingly unreachable. Therefore, if the
courts are not capable of ending gender-based tariff discrimination,
they may have to be ended through legislation.
167. DEMOCRATIC STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, U.S. CONGRESS, THE PINK
TAX: HOW GENDER-BASED PRICING HURTS WOMEN’S BUYING POWER 5 (2016).
168. Id.
169. See generally Gailes et al., supra note 3; supra Section I.B.
170. Gailes et al., supra note 3, at 21.
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While federal and state legislatures have not yet proposed bills
to end gender-based tariffs, there have been large scale movements
to end the “pink tax.” The “pink tax” focuses on gender-based
pricing in general, claiming that women pay more for apparel,
hygiene products, and other goods than men. Ending the wellknown “pink tax” has received much more traction in the
legislature than any discussion of gender-based tariffs.171 Because
tax laws can differentiate by state, it is more likely for the pink tax
to be successfully abolished at the state level. For pink tariffs to
change, however, the federal government will need to be on board
because states cannot change the tariff schedule.
A. Legislative Proposals to End the Pink Tariffs
As of now, no federal law specifically bans gendered price
discrimination, which scholars have acknowledged to be a gaping
hole in protections, especially for females.172 Because of this, much
of the lobbying and litigation that has been proposed is to end price
discrimination. One of the issues here is that when analyses are
done to determine if gendered price discrimination exists, usually
a full deep dive into gendered tariff policies is not included.173 This
is short-sighted because legislators need to acknowledge that price
differentials (especially in apparel) can be rooted back to genderbased tariffs.
Still, some groundwork has been done. The 2016 report
prepared by the Democratic party staff of the U.S. Congress Joint
Economic Committee focused on the price differentials that men
and women pay for different goods and identified the higher tariff
rates placed on women’s goods as the first possible explanation for
the pink tax.174 This research was connected to the Pink Tax Repeal
Act that was first introduced in 2016, but a revised version was

171. See generally ‘Tampon Tax’ Paid Around the World, BBC (Aug. 21, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-32883153 (showing that the “pink tax” has been
vigorously covered in the media).
172. Kenneth A. Jacobsen, Rolling Back the “Pink Tax”: Dim Prospects for Eliminating
Gender-Based Price Discrimination in the Sale of Consumer Goods and Services, 54 CAL. W. L. REV.
241, 251–52 (2018).
173. See generally Jacobsen, supra note 172. Many different studies that show that the pink
tax exists look mostly at sanitary and hygiene products and cost of services, rather than
apparel, which seems to touch tariffs in the most tangible way. Id.
174. Betz et al., supra note 148, at 310.
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introduced in 2018.175 The bill was presented by Jackie Speier with
twenty-four co-sponsors.176 The bill would simply make it illegal
for two products that are substantially similar to be sold at different
prices based on gender.177 However, the bill did not pass and died
on the floor.178 A similar bill was presented in California in 2016,
but there was a lot of opposition to it from retailers and
manufacturers of women’s products and clothing, and it also did
not pass.179 One potential explanation of this actually goes back to
gender-based tariffs. Because importing products can cost more for
one gender rather than another, the clothing manufacturers and
retailers do not want to have to be the ones to bear the brunt of the
tariffs and therefore want to be able to pass the price differentials
on to consumers.
Due to the current political landscape (a democratic majority
Senate and House of Representatives) it might be a very opportune
time for a new bill to be proposed. However, it is vital that the bill
not only address gender-based pricing, but also address one of the
roots of the problem: gender-based tariffs.
B. The International Landscape of Ending Pink Tariffs
Through Legislation
Gender-based tariffs are not unique to the United States. Other
countries have successfully ended gender-based tariffs, giving the
United States examples to follow. Because tariff schedules are
usually determined multilaterally, many countries have chosen to
implement tariffs based on discriminatory gender policies.180
Looking worldwide, female products are taxed 0.7% more than
male products.181 While not a comprehensive list, other countries
that also have gender-based tariff rates are India, Indonesia,
175. Jacobsen, supra note 172, at 260; see Rep. Speier Introduces Pink Tax Repeal Act to End
Gender-Based Pricing Discrimination, JACKIE SPEIER (April 10, 2018), https://speier.house.gov/
2018/4/rep-speier-introduces-pink-tax-repeal-act-end-gender-based-pricing.
176. Rep. Speier Introduces Pink Tax Repeal Act to End Gender-Based Pricing Discrimination,
supra note 175.
177. Jacobsen, supra note 172, at 260–61.
178. Id. at 261.
179. Teri Sforza, ‘Pink Tax’ Bill Dies: You’ll Still Pay More for Products Marketed to Women,
ORANGE CNTY. REG. (Jun. 30, 2016), https://www.ocregister.com/2016/06/30/pink-taxbill-dies-youll-still-pay-more-for-products-marketed-to-women/.
180. See generally Betz et. al, supra note 148.
181. See id. at 307.
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Australia, and Japan.182 However, other developed countries have
recognized the harmful practices of gender-based tariffs and have
outlawed their use, mainly through legislation and executive order,
rather than through litigation and the court system. In the United
States, changes to the HTSUS require congressional approval,
unless the President issues changes in the face of emergency or for
national security reasons, which are unlikely to apply with genderbased tariffs.183
Switzerland is one country that has at least acknowledged
gender-based tariffs exist and taken the first steps to abolish
them.184 Originally women’s apparel had higher tariff rates because
the tariffs were set on the basis of the weight of the clothes.185
Because men’s clothes used to weigh more than female clothes,
female clothing had higher tariffs to make them equal.186 When this
was discovered, the federal government started an inquiry to
examine all of the different tariff rates and ensure that they were
gender equal.187 Switzerland has planned at the next WTO
negotiation round to get rid of gender-based tariffs; however, due
to the stalling of the Doha round, they still have their gender-based
tariffs in place.188
Canada is one example of a country that has ended their
gender-based tariffs. When outlawing the tariffs, their trade
department said:
Some gender bias has crept into the Customs Tariff over the years,
with differing tariff rates being applied to textiles depending on
whether they are used in men’s/boy’s or women’s/girl’s apparel.
The replacement of these gender-specific tariff items with genderneutral provisions will help to modernize the Customs Tariff. The
CITT report makes progress on this issue by recommending the
consolidation of a number of existing gender-specific tariff items
into new gender-neutral duty-free provisions. However, even
with the implementation of these recommendations, there will
still remain a number of gender-specific tariff items. To address

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See id. at 309.
See CASEY, supra note 21, at 1–2.
Betz et. al, supra note 148, at 310.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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these remaining items, the Department of Finance will be issuing
a Canada Gazette Notice in the near future identifying the tariff
items in question, proposing new wording to eliminate the
gender-bias and indicating the requirements for submissions by
interested parties.189

Canada’s example provides an effective model that the United
States can follow legislatively. The first important step is that this
price differential be acknowledged as an issue by Congress and by
the International Trade Commission, and then it can be rooted out
at its cause.
C. The Future of Pink Tariff Legislation and the Equal
Rights Amendment
The passage of the Equal Rights Amendment could also aid the
abolishment of gender-based tariffs, especially with regards to
future litigation. We are one of the few countries in the developed
world that does not have a constitutional provision providing for
equal treatment of women. Scholars have theorized that one of the
reasons that women are not receiving equal treatment with regards
to taxes and pensions is because the Equal Rights Amendment has
not yet been passed.190 While some that oppose the Equal Rights
Amendment do so because they feel like the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause grants women all of the
necessary protection that they may need, this is not the case.191 One
of the issues is that under the Equal Protection Clause, courts use
only intermediate scrutiny in sex discrimination cases.192 However,
if the Equal Rights Amendment passes, there will not be any laws
that can differentiate on the basis of gender. Gender-based tariff
litigation would be easier to win under the Equal Rights
Amendment than under current available causes of action.

189. Complaint at 10, Pac. Sunwear of Cal., Inc. v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-00300 (Ct.
Int’l Trade Aug. 16, 2011).
190. Carolyn B. Maloney, Why the United States Needs an Equal Rights Amendment, 89
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N J. 53, 53 (2017).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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D. Other Legislative Solutions to Effectively End Gender-Based Tariffs
The World Trade Organization and World Bank Group
released a document entitled “Women and Trade, the Role of Trade
in Promoting Gender Equality.”193 It found that trade openness in
general will increase women’s purchasing power by providing
them with more economic opportunities.194 It also found that
women feel the tariff burdens at higher rates than men.195 This is
due to the fact that one of the areas with the most tariffs is apparel,
where women spend comparatively more.196 The World Trade
Organization has said that “[e]liminating the gender-related tariff
differentials (for the same products) or reducing or removing
altogether the relevant applied tariffs would help women business
owners to access more and bigger markets.”197 Free market policies
have been shown repeatedly to lift up countries and economies.
Therefore, one solution (though potentially more difficult to
achieve) could be fighting for abolition of all gender-based tariffs.
Advocating for more women in politics can also lead to less
gender-based tariffs. Political Science researchers Timm Betz,
David Fortunato, and Diana Z. O’Brien have examined other
countries use of gender-based tariffs in depth and found an
interesting correlation between the number of women that hold
office and the amount of gender-based tariffs that a country
imposes.198 By analyzing almost 200,000 pairs of tariff rates across
167 countries they discovered that women’s goods are taxed at rates
0.7% higher than men’s goods.199 Because tariffs and taxes are
usually levied by the legislature, it makes sense that in countries
with more females in the legislature that there would be fewer
gender-based tariffs.200 The researchers discovered that “a 10% gain
in seat share decreases the pink tax by approximately 0.44%.”201
They also showed that the same result did not play through in non193. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION & THE WORLD BANK GROUP, WOMEN AND TRADE:
THE ROLE OF TRADE IN PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY (2020).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 5.
196. See id. at 11.
197. Id.
198. Betz et. al, supra note 148, at 312.
199. Id. at 307.
200. Id. at 310.
201. Id. at 312.
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democracies, which makes sense if tariffs are not decided
democratically in these locations.202 As more and more women are
elected into the legislature, this is more evidence that gender-based
tariffs could soon be abolished, or at least the landscape has been
created for this to be a viable possibility.
CONCLUSION
What the future holds for United States trade policy and
gender-based tariffs remains an open question. It is a worrisome
fact that in general tariff rates are low, but when they are
discriminatory, they are very high.203 Gender-based tariffs have
been shown to hurt women by lessening their spending power thus
exacerbating the gender wage gap. While this is a recognizable
challenge, the abolition of these tariffs remains a difficult task. Still,
the two major avenues for change lie clearly in successful litigation
or new proposed legislation.
Although over 200 companies have brought claims asserting
that these tariffs are unconstitutional because they discriminate on
the basis of sex, only two of these cases have had their day in court.
Both Totes-Isotoner and Rack Room contained confusing and
frustrating logic as the court denied both cases for failure to state a
valid claim. Even though the standard of intermediate scrutiny
used to analyze gender discrimination cases should apply, the
courts did not apply this in a satisfying way. The courts did not
consider facial discrimination and said that the claimants must
show more than disparate impact. While the precedents set in TotesIsotoner and Rack Room seem to set the bar for a successful pleading
at an unreachable height, cultural changes may lead to a new result
if a new claim were brought. With a new cultural backdrop that is
seemingly more ready to discuss gender issues, strong new
evidence of the disparate impact of these tariffs on women, new
evidence of governmental recognition of the issues, and a new
Trade Court makeup, there may be an open possibility for a
successful new case.
If the litigation avenue continues to be filled with roadblocks,
there is also a likelihood that gender-based tariffs can be abolished
202. Id. at 313.
203. See supra section I.A for an explanation of tariff rates and how they are
substantially higher for apparel than other goods.
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through legislation. Legislation to end price discrimination has
been proposed, and it is likely that gender-based tariffs could be
included in these proposals if more people become aware of their
connection to price discrimination. The United States could follow
other countries’ examples such as Canada to root out these tariffs
and pass legislation to end them. With current Democratic control
of both the Senate and the House of Representatives and more
women than ever serving in positions of power, the United States
may be in a prime position for successful legislation. Other avenues
could be potentially used to end this issue as well, such as unilateral
lowering of apparel tariffs, passing the Equal Rights Amendment,
or electing more women to positions of power.
Regardless of how it is done, the public needs to be aware of the
impact of gender differences in apparel tariffs. These tariffs drive
up consumer prices, which have a negative impact on women. It is
time for these arcane tariffs to die.
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